Hardball Vs. Beanball: Identifying Fundamentally Antidemocratic Tactics by Shugerman, Jed
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Hardball Vs. Beanball: Identifying Fundamentally Antidemocratic 
Tactics 
Jed Shugerman 
Fordham University, jshugerman@law.fordham.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jed Shugerman, Hardball Vs. Beanball: Identifying Fundamentally Antidemocratic Tactics, 119 Colum. L. 
Rev. Online 85 (2019) 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/1038 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Fordham University School of Law
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE 
VOL. 119 APRIL 2, 2019 PAGES 85–122 
 85
HARDBALL VS. BEANBALL: IDENTIFYING 
FUNDAMENTALLY ANTIDEMOCRATIC TACTICS 
Jed Handelsman Shugerman * 
The “constitutional hardball” metaphor used by legal scholars and 
political scientists illuminates an important phenomenon in American 
politics, but it obscures a crisis in American democracy. In baseball, 
hardball encompasses legitimate tactics: pitching inside to brush a batter 
back but not injure, hard slides, hard tags. Baseball fans celebrate 
hardball. Many of the constitutional hardball maneuvers previously 
identified by scholars have been legitimate, if aggressive, constitutional 
political moves. But the label “hardball” has been interpreted too 
broadly to include illegitimate, fundamentally undemocratic tactics. I 
suggest a different baseball metaphor for such tactics: beanball, pitches 
meant to injure and knock out the opposing player, against the basic 
rules of the game.   
In this Reply to Fishkin, Pozen, and Bernstein, I first address 
Bernstein’s examples of President Barack Obama and Democrats 
engaging in hardball. I note that Fishkin and Pozen’s “asymmetry” 
thesis acknowledged clearly that Democrats play hardball, even if not as 
aggressively as Republicans have. I discuss government shutdowns, 
birtherism, debt ceiling threats, abuses of the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
and the contrasting manipulations leading to the Iraq War versus 
the Iran nuclear deal.  
This Reply then identifies examples of Republicans’ fundamentally 
antidemocratic beanball: voter ID laws and other voting restrictions, 
extreme gerrymandering, marginalizing racial minorities, and abusing the 
DOJ. Beanball’s destructive politics reflect racial status anxiety, paranoia, 
and a panic over dispossession and the loss of historical privilege.  
 
                                                                                                                           
 *  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am thankful to Joey Fishkin, 
David Pozen, and David Bernstein for their thoughtful engagement and feedback. I thank 
Greg Sargent and Paul Rosenberg for their comments and Zachary Piaker for excellent 
editing. I thank my father, Clem Shugerman, for inspiring a lifetime appreciation of 
baseball, sports metaphors, and bad puns. And I thank Danya Handelsman for a lifetime 
of support, and for being a good sport. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, Professors Joseph Fishkin and 
David Pozen offer a compelling argument, connecting the legal literature 
on “constitutional hardball” with the political science literature on 
asymmetric polarization.1 “For a quarter of a century,” they contend, 
“Republican officials have been more willing than Democratic officials to 
play constitutional hardball . . . . Democrats have also availed themselves 
of hardball throughout this period, but not with the same frequency or 
intensity.”2 They argue that “[t]his partisan gap is in some ways analogous 
to the phenomenon of ‘asymmetric polarization’ that social scientists 
have documented” and “suggest that the two phenomena are intertwined.”3 
Professor David Bernstein responds to their essay with three main 
points.4 First, government shutdowns—some of Fishkin and Pozen’s main 
examples of Republican constitutional hardball—are the fault of both 
parties and predate the 1995 Bill Clinton–Newt Gingrich hardball.5 
Second, he offers more examples of President Obama’s hardball than 
Fishkin and Pozen presented.6 Third, he takes an extended dive into 
President Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran as a “particularly 
important” and “aggressive” kind of constitutional hardball.7 
This Reply to Bernstein first responds to each of these points directly, 
questioning some of the factual bases and interpretations of these events. 
This exchange exemplifies some of the challenges inherent in the 
discourse about partisan retaliation and tit-for-tat hardball. Each side can 
recite its grievances and give its own weight to them. Fishkin, Pozen, and 
Bernstein can each be questioned for which examples they categorize as 
hardball, the weight they give particular episodes, and what they omit. 
But Bernstein’s reminders about how Clinton and Obama played 
hardball miss Fishkin and Pozen’s point about reciprocity with 
asymmetry: Both sides are playing, but Republicans play hardball harder. 
A closer look at Bernstein’s examples, and his omissions, helps confirm 
Fishkin and Pozen’s argument. 
Fishkin and Pozen acknowledge the “considerable” methodological 
challenges of studying chicken-and-egg escalation, both in terms of 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional 
Hardball, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 915 (2018). 
 2. Id. at 918. 
 3. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 4. See generally David E. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball Yes, Asymmetric Not So 
Much, 118 Colum. L. Rev. Online 207 (2018), https://columbialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Bernstein-CONSTITUTIONAL_HARDBALL_YES_ASYMMETRIC_ 
NOT_SO_MUCH.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVM8-VB8F]. 
 5. See id. at 210–11. 
 6. See id. at 214–16. 
 7. See id. at 209, 222–32. 
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historicizing it and of measuring it objectively.8 Their essay’s goal was not 
to produce a definitive method of quantifying constitutional hardball or 
documenting its historical progression. The lived experience of the past 
three decades is probably sufficient to show that Republicans have played 
more aggressive hardball than Democrats. But if there is only one 
category of hardball, it’s hard to debate competing partisan claims. My 
Reply intends to move the ball forward on hardball debates because 
sometimes the “hardball” metaphor falls short at the warning track. 
In baseball, “hardball” is an aggressive but legitimate style of play: 
pitching inside, sliding hard, hard tags. All are part of the game. Mark 
Tushnet’s original article introducing the “hardball” metaphor referred 
to “brushback” pitches intended to intimidate (but not strike) the batter, 
a legitimate, classic hardball tactic.9 But then there is beanball: throwing 
fastballs at batters’ heads not just to brush back but to injure, to get 
retribution, or to knock the player out of the game. Beanball may 
happen, but it’s against the rules, it’s wrong, it’s illegitimate, and it tends 
to lead to bench-clearing brawls.10 Much of what Fishkin and Pozen are 
debating with Bernstein are examples of hardball, but some of the 
debate is more helpfully categorized as a difference of kind rather than 
degree. Some hyperaggressive tactics are more like rigging the game or 
injuring the opposing players. What goes beyond hardball, becoming 
instead constitutional beanball? I suggest that political tactics that are 
fundamentally antidemocratic constitute beanball. 
In baseball, the term “beanball” is not used as a subset of hardball. 
Teams playing hardball are not penalized, and they earn praise by most 
fans of the sport. But pitchers who deliberately throw beanballs are 
immediately ejected and fined.11 Some fans might praise their own 
                                                                                                                           
 8. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 927–28. 
 9. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523, 544 (2004). 
 10. I looked for references to “constitutional beanball” in the legal literature but 
found none. In general political publications, I found the following concluding sentences 
in a Salon article by Paul Rosenberg: “Tushnet calls it ‘constitutional hardball.’ But at times 
like this, it feels like constitutional beanball, instead.” Paul Rosenberg, Ted Cruz Just 
Makes this Stuff Up: Scalia, the GOP and the Lies They Tell About the Constitution, Salon 
(Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.salon.com/2016/02/20/ted_cruz_just_makes_this_stuff_up_ 
scalia_the_gop_and_the_lies_they_tell_about_the_constitution/ [https://perma.cc/VX35-
4FWU]; see also Paul Rosenberg, Now They’re Trying to Steal 2016: The Demented GOP Schemes 
to Rewire the Electoral College and Elect a Tea Party President, Salon (Dec. 6, 2014), https:// 
www.salon.com/2014/12/06/now_theyre_trying_to_steal_2016_the_demented_gop_schemes_to_re
wire_the_electoral_college_and_elect_a_tea_party_president/ [https://perma.cc/9PJ4-NU68] 
(“It’s not constitutional hardball, actually. It’s constitutional beanball. Batter up?”). 
Following my posting of a draft of this Piece, Rosenberg published an endorsement. See 
Paul Rosenberg, Welcome to the Era of Constitutional Beanball: How Republican Dirty 
Tricks Got Even Dirtier, Salon (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/02/ 
09/welcome-to-the-era-of-constitutional-beanball-how-republican-dirty-tricks-got-even-dirtier/ 
[https://perma.cc/9RCD-N3C4]. 
 11. The unwritten rules and norms of baseball are a bit more complicated than what 
I have presented here. If one pitcher hits another team’s player or if a player slides 
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pitchers’ beanballs out of a sense of grievance or retribution in a specific 
rivalry, but such tactics are generally not respected by neutral observers 
or opposing fans. Similarly, one political party might praise its own leaders’ 
extreme tactics, but when they cross the line into disenfranchisement, 
neutral observers would not defend them. The baseball analogy that 
brings these themes of beanball and politics together is the scene in 
the film 42 when Jackie Robinson bats against Fred Ostermueller.12 
Ostermueller, with racist intent, hits Robinson in the head to knock him 
out of the game.13 Some political tactics similarly intend to knock voters 
out of the game. Other sports metaphors could include flagrant fouls, 
targeting the head, a game misconduct, or a red-card foul. But let’s stick 
with baseball. 
Over the past several decades, Republicans have more frequently 
engaged in antidemocratic beanball, both by making voting more 
difficult for targeted groups and extreme gerrymandering.14 One might 
add the stigmatization and marginalization of racial minorities15 and the 
abuse of the Department of Justice (DOJ) for partisan prosecutions and 
protection along party lines.16 It is also worth noting times when leading 
Republicans such as President George W. Bush, and presidential nominees 
John McCain and Mitt Romney, admirably have refrained from hardball 
and beanball.17 Unfortunately, more recent history has been marked by a 
                                                                                                                           
aggressively enough to injure, the opposing team’s pitcher will sometimes retaliate with a 
beanball, and many accept such retaliation as legitimate—but it is still against the rules 
and is grounds for ejection and fines. It also tends to lead to bench-clearing brawls. 
“Bench-clearing” is another baseball metaphor I’ve used for nineteenth-century partisan 
impeachment efforts and “ripper bills” that abolished courts. See Jed Handelsman 
Shugerman, The People’s Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America 66 (2012). 
 12. 42 (Legendary Pictures 2013); see also Don O’Brien, Quincy Native Plays Key, Yet 
Unflattering Role in Robinson Biopic, Quincy Herald-Whig (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.whig.com/ 
story/22098867/quincy-native-plays-key-yet-unflattering-role-in-jackie-robinson-film# [https:// 
perma.cc/84R6-KFZQ]. 
 13. In the actual game, Ostermueller hit Robinson on the wrist and denied racist 
intent. See O’Brien, supra note 12. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. One important example is the “birther” conspiracy theory, a racist weaponization 
of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause. Donald Trump’s promotion of the conspiracy theory 
played an important role in his rise to political prominence and is a core example of his 
appeals to white nationalism. See Ashley Parker & Steve Eder, Inside the Six Weeks Donald 
Trump Was a Nonstop ‘Birther,’ N.Y. Times (July 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/07/03/us/politics/donald-trump-birther-obama.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (describing how Trump harnessed “the discomfort, in some quarters of American 
society, with the election of the nation’s first black President [reflected in the ‘birther’ 
movement] . . . for political gain”). 
 16. See infra notes 67–76 and accompanying text (describing the investigation into 
the George W. Bush Administration’s firing of U.S. Attorneys for partisan reasons). 
 17. For example, to George W. Bush’s credit, he did not demonize Arabs and Muslims 
after 9/11. See Mehdi Hasan, Opinion, Why I Miss George W. Bush, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/opinion/campaign-stops/why-i-miss-george-w-bush.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (distinguishing Bush’s rhetoric on Muslims from 
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resurgence of beanball. Identifying Republican beanball as a recurring 
practice over at least the past three decades, and perhaps longer, 
demonstrates that the antidemocratic tactics of Trumpism are not a break 
from the establishment Republican Party; rather, they are continuous, if 
only more extreme. 
My Reply is not meant to serve as a neutral umpire to referee these 
pieces (sorry). Nor does my Reply try to fully document this historical 
beanball claim. Rather, it sketches out these themes and points toward 
some evidence for reframing this debate. Part I evaluates Bernstein’s 
claims about Democratic hardball, suggesting that he does not take 
seriously the asymmetries in the history of government shutdowns or in 
the more aggressive Republican hardball tactics during the George W. 
Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations. Part II fleshes out the 
concept of constitutional beanball and provides examples of the 
Republican Party engaging in such tactics. The bottom line is that 
Republicans have been more likely to engage in both hardball and 
beanball over the past few decades. Fishkin and Pozen highlight some 
structural reasons as well as some cultural and historical sources for this 
dynamic, citing historian Richard Hofstadter.18 I conclude by examining 
Hofstadter more closely on the paranoid politics of historical entitlement, 
dispossession, and racial status anxiety. 
I. TAKING REPUBLICAN ASYMMETRIES SERIOUSLY 
This Part evaluates Bernstein’s examples of Democratic constitutional 
hardball in light of Fishkin and Pozen’s thesis that the two parties play 
hardball asymmetrically. Section I.A reexamines the history of government 
shutdowns and questions Bernstein’s characterization of them as a 
constitutional hardball tactic used by both parties. Section I.B recounts 
some of the unprecedented forms of Republican hardball the Obama 
Administration encountered throughout its existence. Section I.C 
discusses the Obama Administration’s nuclear agreement with Iran, the 
example of Democratic constitutional hardball that Bernstein illustrates 
with greatest specificity, and suggests that the Obama Administration’s 
                                                                                                                           
that of later Republican politicians). He did nevertheless grossly mishandle the Iraq War and 
use misinformation to build the case for that war. See infra notes 108, 126 and accompanying 
text. 
McCain did not focus on Reverend Jeremiah Wright and rejected racist conspiracy 
theories about Obama during the 2008 presidential campaign. See infra notes 98–99, 102 
and accompanying text. 
Romney also did not raise Reverend Wright during his 2012 presidential campaign. He 
did, however, seek Trump’s endorsement at a time when Trump’s only political relevance 
was as the “Birther-in-Chief.” See infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
 18. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 973, 975 (citing Richard Hofstadter, The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics, Harper’s Mag. (Nov. 1964), http://harpers.org/ 
archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics [https://perma.cc/PR8R-SEV2]). 
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hardball in this arena appears far less egregious when contextualized with 
the Republican hardball that preceded and followed it. 
A.  Government Shutdowns: Details and Context Matter 
The timing of these essays is remarkable. As I write, a historic 
government shutdown has only recently concluded.19 And government 
shutdowns are the subject of Bernstein’s first critique of Fishkin and 
Pozen’s thesis. Bernstein writes: “The authors seem to believe that 
shutting down the government is something Republicans—but not 
Democrats—are inclined to do.”20 He asserts that both sides are to blame: 
“[I]f the President and Congress are unable to reach a compromise that 
would lead the President to sign a spending bill passed by Congress, both 
the President and Congress played constitutional hardball to shut down 
the government.”21 
But Fishkin and Pozen explicitly acknowledge that the Democrats 
triggered their own shutdown over the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program (DACA): 
In January 2018, Senate Democrats took the once-
unthinkable (for Democrats) step of shutting down the 
government in a bid to prompt legislative action on the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program that the 
Trump Administration had announced it would end. Yet to the 
dismay of their activist base, the Democrats “collapsed and 
accepted the Republican terms for reopening the government” 
within three days.22 
Bernstein does note that Fishkin and Pozen refer to the January 2018 
shutdown.23 But, recall that Fishkin and Pozen do not argue that only 
Republicans play hardball, nor do they argue that Presidents Clinton or 
Obama avoided hardball. This is a helpful moment to remember Fishkin 
and Pozen’s thesis. They do not argue that only Republicans play hardball, 
nor do they argue that Presidents Clinton or Obama avoided hardball. 
Rather, Fishkin and Pozen recognize that “[c]onstitutional hardball remains 
                                                                                                                           
 19. See Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was 
the Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/ 
01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (last updated Jan. 25, 2019) (describing the thirty-four-day government shutdown, 
which spanned from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, as the longest ever). 
 20. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 210. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 919 n.13 (quoting Newt Gingrich, Opinion, 
Newt Gingrich: Schumer Shutdown Turns into Schumer Surrender, Fox News (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/newt-gingrich-schumer-shutdown-turns-into-schumer- 
surrender.html [https://perma.cc/JNF8-QPKQ]); see also id. at 961 (acknowledging that 
“[g]overnment shutdowns under both Clinton and Obama forced agencies to curtail 
nonessential operations and services for nontrivial periods of time”). 
 23. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 210 n.13. 
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reciprocal but not symmetrical,”24 and that while “[Republican officeholders] 
appear to have a dominant market position” on constitutional hardball, they 
“clearly have no monopoly.”25  Fishkin and Pozen highlight partisan 
escalation but emphasize its asymmetric dynamic. Bernstein is right to 
raise episodes of hardball that Fishkin and Pozen overlook or understate, 
but these reminders are not enough to overturn the balance of Fishkin 
and Pozen’s interpretation. 
Bernstein’s own interpretation of the history of government 
shutdowns is a stretch. Bernstein observes that both sides bear responsibility 
for any shutdown; it takes two to tango.26 He also criticizes Fishkin and 
Pozen for “ignoring the Reagan and Bush shutdowns.”27 Let’s first take a 
closer look at those shutdowns. Before new DOJ interpretations of the 
Antideficiency Act in 1980 and 1981, the failure to pass a budget or a 
funding bill did not necessarily lead to a shutdown.28 They often had no 
real-world effect because the departments and agencies kept running.29 
Bernstein then points to a “four-day shutdown” in 1981 and claims, 
“During the remaining Reagan and Bush years, the government shut 
down eight times after congressional Democrats refused to agree to the 
budgetary or policy demands of the Republican President.”30 But Bernstein 
omits just how short each of these mini-shutdowns were. In fact, the 1981 
shutdown lasted just two days,31 not four, and the resulting worker 
                                                                                                                           
 24. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 927 (emphasis omitted). 
 25. Id. at 935. 
 26. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 210 (“At a minimum, if the President and 
Congress are unable to reach a compromise that would lead the President to sign a 
spending bill passed by Congress, both the President and Congress played constitutional 
hardball to shut down the government.”). 
 27. Id. at 212. 
 28. See Dylan Matthews, Here Is Every Previous Government Shutdown, Why They 
Happened and How They Ended, Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Sept. 25, 2013), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/25/here-is-every-previous-government-
shutdown-why-they-happened-and-how-they-ended/ [https://perma.cc/CD8L-S7RJ] 
[hereinafter Matthews, Every Previous Government Shutdown]; see also Cong. Research 
Serv., RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects 4–8 
(2018) [hereinafter CRS, Federal Government Shutdown], https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RL34680.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6C7-DFF6] (describing DOJ’s changing legal interpretation 
of the Antideficiency Act’s requirements). 
 29. Matthews, Every Previous Government Shutdown, supra note 28; see also CRS, 
Federal Government Shutdown, supra note 28, at 2 (“Although a shutdown may result 
from a funding gap, the two events are distinct. This is because a funding gap may result in 
a shutdown of affected projects or activities in some instances but not others.”). 
 30. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 211. 
 31. See Matthews, Every Previous Government Shutdown, supra note 28; Ryan Struyk 
& Joyce Tseng, The History of US Government Shutdowns in 1 Chart, CNN (Jan. 13, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/13/politics/us-government-shutdowns-budget-chart/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/QYC7-6RPG]. 
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furlough was actually just one day long.32 The 1982 shutdown, the first in 
Bernstein’s list of the additional eight, lasted just one day, and it doesn’t 
fit Bernstein’s description because it was an accidental shutdown 
resulting from scheduling conflicts with social events and fundraisers.33 
The remaining seven shutdowns under Reagan and Bush Sr. were not 
accidental, but they were remarkably short: three, three, two, one, one, 
one, and three days, respectively.34 
These shutdowns were so short and minor that when the New York 
Times wrote a “Looking Back” article on past government shutdowns as 
the Clinton–Gingrich shutdown loomed in 1995, it included only four of 
them described as times when “some Federal workers were sent home.”35 
Funding gaps do not necessarily lead to furloughs or shutdowns with 
real-world impact. Notably, the “Looking Back” piece was one of the 
main sources for the article that Bernstein relied on for his shutdown 
history.36 It is helpful to read the full article for context—and note how 
short it is: 
Since 1981, the authority of Federal agencies to spend 
money has lapsed nine times after the Oct. 1 start of the new 
fiscal year. The gaps have ranged from a few hours to four days. 
On four occasions, some Federal workers were sent home. 
NOV. 23, 1981—President Ronald Reagan, in a struggle 
with Congress, ordered the furlough of 241,000 of the 
Government’s 2.1 million employees, those deemed 
nonessential to protect life, national security or Federal 
property. This was the first time a chief executive had ordered 
so large a shutdown of Federal operations. The Subcommittee 
on Civil Service of the House Committee on Post Office and 
Civil Service estimated that the one-day furlough cost taxpayers 
$80 million to $90 million in back pay and related expenses. 
OCT. 4, 1984—An estimated 500,000 of the Government’s 
2.8 million civil servants were sent home at midday because 
Congress failed to approve a stopgap money bill. The furlough 
lasted half a day, and workers were back at their desks the next 
day. Back payments for the furlough were estimated at $65 
million. 
                                                                                                                           
 32. See Monica Borkowski, Looking Back: Previous Government Shutdowns, N.Y. 
Times (Nov. 11, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/11/us/looking-back-previous-
government-shutdowns.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 33. See Matthews, Every Previous Government Shutdown, supra note 28. 
 34. Struyk & Tseng, supra note 31. 
 35. Borkowski, supra note 32. 
 36. See Dylan Matthews, Government Shutdown 2019: All 20 Previous Government 
Shutdowns, Explained, Vox (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 
2018/1/19/16905584 [https://perma.cc/VY88-LJFF] [hereinafter Matthews, Government 
Shutdown 2019]; see also Bernstein, supra note 4, at 211 n.19 (citing an earlier iteration of 
Matthews, Government Shutdown 2019, supra, at least four times). 
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OCT. 17, 1986—At midday, the Government sent home 
500,000 workers, all classified as nonessential, because Congress 
failed to pass a spending bill to keep their agencies running. 
Again, the furlough lasted only half a day. The time off was 
estimated by the House panel to have cost taxpayers more than 
$61 million in lost work. 
OCT. 6, 1990—The shutdown started on the Saturday of the 
long Columbus Day weekend. For three days the Statue of Liberty, 
national parks and museums were padlocked, but plans to send 
most of the 2.4 million Federal workers home on Tuesday, Oct. 
9, were scuttled after Congress and President George Bush 
completed a budget deal before dawn. The General Accounting 
Office found that the estimated partial costs for the shutdown 
were $1.7 million.37 
That’s it. When the New York Times reviewed the history of these “shutdowns” 
for actual furloughs—periods when government workers were sent 
home—it found a grand total of one day, two afternoons, and a long 
weekend.38  
Why did the New York Times find only four furloughs if there were 
nine funding gaps as part of 1980s–1990s budget impasses? Media bias? 
No, it seems that short funding gaps are often not shutdowns at all. 
Consider the reporting on government closures during the 2018–2019 
shutdown. According to Politico, federal departments and agencies did not 
actually run out of funds to continue their services for over a week. For ten 
days, departments “limped along on leftover money, coasted through the 
quiet days of the holidays and paid staff with checks already prepped 
before the lapse.”39 Only in the New Year did the shutdown “get[] real”40: 
Many of the departments and agencies hit by the shutdown, 
which began Dec. 22, have reached a breaking point in their 
ability to go on with minimal disruption. They are running out 
of carryover cash and time to prep checks for the mid-month 
pay period during the lapse . . . . 
. . . . 
All the while, federal workers are left wondering whether 
they will get their next check on Jan. 11. While paychecks for 
federal employees went out last week after a pay period ended 
                                                                                                                           
 37. Borkowski, supra note 32 (emphasis added). 
 38. I grew up in the Washington, D.C., area in the 1980s and early 1990s, the child of 
a nonessential federal employee, and I have no recollection of these furloughs, probably 
because they were nonevents. 
 39. Jennifer Scholtes, Caitlin Emma & Katy O’Donnell, How the Shutdown Is 
Reaching a Breaking Point, Politico (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/ 
01/01/how-the-shutdown-is-reaching-a-breaking-point-1053885 [https://perma.cc/WG4R-
QABN]. 
 40. Id. 
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on Dec. 22, the pay period for that next check ends Saturday, 
and pay processing time varies from agency to agency.41 
In light of these accounts, it makes sense that Fishkin and Pozen did not 
include these minor events—essentially a snow day, two half-days, and a 
long weekend—as examples of “hardball.” 
But even if they are included, these shutdowns still undermine 
Bernstein’s claims. Bernstein’s view of these shutdowns is that they are all 
bipartisan. It takes both Congress and the President—and effectively, 
both parties—to tango: “At a minimum, if the President and Congress 
are unable to reach a compromise that would lead the President to sign a 
spending bill passed by Congress, both the President and Congress played 
constitutional hardball to shut down the government.”42 
However, this is not how shutdowns actually play out, practically, 
politically, or legislatively. When the President and Congress reach a 
budget impasse, the conventional next step is to pass a continuing 
resolution to keep the government funded at the status quo—to extend 
the same budgeting while budget negotiations continue.43 Every once in 
a while, one side says, “No, no continuing resolution unless we get X, a 
change in the status quo.” Practically and politically, the side that rejects 
the continuing resolution status quo because of a demand to change the 
status quo is the side bearing more responsibility for the shutdown. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, Presidents Reagan and Bush were generally seeking 
changes to the status quo in terms of budget cuts, but Democrats often 
had their own demands, too.44 Both sides usually shared responsibility, 
and each impasse was resolved quickly with minimal furloughs, if any.45 
There was not much hardball. 
But the shutdowns of the 1990s and the twenty-first century have 
been different. In 1995, Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole 
passed not a status quo continuing resolution but rather one that increased 
Medicare premiums, deregulated the environment, and included a bal-
anced budget requirement.46 Clinton held out for the status quo and 
                                                                                                                           
 41. Id. 
 42. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 210. 
 43. See Michael Doran, Legislative Entrenchment and Federal Fiscal Policy, 81 Law & 
Contemp. Probs., no. 2, 2018, at 27, 51–52 (“[W]hen the [federal budget] process breaks 
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 44. See Matthews, Government Shutdown 2019, supra note 36. 
 45. See Matthews, Every Previous Government Shutdown, supra note 28 (describing 
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three days). 
 46. See Matthews, Government Shutdown 2019, supra note 36 (“Gingrich and Dole 
sent Clinton a continuing resolution including hikes to Medicare premiums, rollbacks of 
environmental regulations, and a requirement to balance the budget within seven years. 
Clinton vetoed it, and the government went into shutdown.”). 
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clearly would have signed a status quo continuing resolution.47 The two 
Gingrich–Clinton shutdowns, lasting a total of over five weeks, were far 
more significant than any shutdown that came before them. And they 
were more the result of Gingrich, Dole, and congressional Republicans’ 
strategy of taking this unusual step: hardball. 48  Yes, Clinton vetoed 
Republican spending bills, but he forcefully spoke out against shutdowns.49 
Of course, the norm of negotiating while passing continuing resolutions 
maintains the status quo, but the continuation of the status quo is the 
nature of norms and conventions generally while changing the status quo 
is the nature of hardball. Clinton sought to preserve the status quo 
substantively and procedurally (that is, no shutdowns), while Gingrich was 
seeking to upset the status quo substantively and procedurally with the 
first meaningful and extended shutdown in American history. That is 
consistent with the Fishkin and Pozen thesis. 
Digging a bit deeper, Clinton played a kind of hardball against 
shutdowns in 1996. When Clinton gave his 1996 State of the Union 
speech months after the Oklahoma City bombing, in which right-wing 
extremist Timothy McVeigh killed 168 people, Clinton introduced Richard 
Dean, a Vietnam War veteran who worked in the federal building and 
rushed back in four times to rescue those trapped inside. 50  To 
widespread applause, Clinton continued: 
But Richard Dean’s story doesn’t end there. This last 
November, he was forced out of his office when the government 
shut down. And the second time the government shut down, he 
continued helping Social Security recipients, but he was working 
                                                                                                                           
 47. See Steven M. Gillon, The Pact: Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, and the Rivalry that 
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open without attaching any additional demands. Instead, [congressional Republicans] sent 
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drop in Medicare premiums.”). 
 48. See McKay Coppins, The Man Who Broke Politics, Atlantic (Nov. 2018), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/newt-gingrich-says-youre-welcome/570832/ 
[https://perma.cc/B49G-LGRM] (“Gingrich’s famous budget battles with Bill Clinton in 
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 49. See, e.g., clintonlibrary42, President Clinton’s Remarks on the Government Shutdown 
(1995), YouTube (July 16, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9EUn5YwLtB0 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting President Clinton during a press conference on 
November 14, 1995) (“I vetoed the [latest] spending bill . . . because America can never 
accept under pressure what it would not accept in free and open debate. . . . [T]he 
Republicans are following a very explicit strategy . . . to use the threat of a government 
shutdown to force America to accept their [spending] cuts . . . .”); infra note 51 and 
accompanying text. 
 50. See Peter Keating, Remembering Oklahoma City, and How Bill Clinton Saved His 
Presidency, N.Y. Mag.: Daily Intelligencer (Apr. 19, 2010), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/ 
2010/04/remembering_oklahoma_city_and.html [https://perma.cc/9YAA-GR3M]. 
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without pay . . . I challenge all of you in this chamber: Never, 
ever shut the federal government down again.51 
Clinton was implicitly signaling a link between the terrorist’s extremism 
and the Republican shutdown’s extremism. That’s political hardball, but 
not constitutional hardball. Since it was also more of a hint than a direct 
link it does not constitute beanball. 
The 2013 shutdown involved a similar dynamic: House Republicans 
were able to get Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and President 
Obama to compromise closer to the Republican budget numbers.52 But 
Senator Ted Cruz and the “Tea Party” House members (later, the 
Freedom Caucus) blew up the deal in order to play hardball on 
defunding the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (also known as “Obamacare”).53 
They were obviously never going to succeed, but the Tea Party wing was 
somehow able to convince Speaker John Boehner and the rest of the 
House Republicans to shut down the government for half of October.54 
The capacity of the Republican Party’s right-wing backbenchers to have 
this level of control over party leadership in 2013 confirms Fishkin and 
Pozen’s understanding of hardball. 
Democrats were more responsible for the January 2018 shutdown 
because they were pushing for the change in the status quo in seeking 
immigration reform measures and protections for DACA recipients.55 But 
this shutdown lasted only from a Saturday through a Monday, effectively 
                                                                                                                           
 51. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Clinton’s 1996 State of the Union speech); see 
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Over,’ N.Y. Times (Jan. 24, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/24/us/state-union-
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V3RF]. 
 52. Democrats proposed $1.058 trillion in discretionary spending, while Republicans 
proposed $968 billion. See Dylan Matthews, Everything You Need to Know About Why the 
Government Might Shut Down, Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Sept. 18, 2013), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/18/everything-you-need-to-know-about-why-
the-government-might-shut-down/ [https://perma.cc/HJ28-V48Z]. The two sides more or 
less had a deal at $988 billion—three-quarters of the way toward the GOP position. See id. 
 53. See Manu Raju, Some Colleagues Angry with Cruz, Politico (Oct. 2, 2013), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/ted-cruz-blasted-by-angry-gop-colleagues-government- 
shutdown-097753 [https://perma.cc/TN2G-XJWG]. 
 54. See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans Back Down, Ending Crisis 
over Shutdown and Debt Limit, N.Y. Times (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/17/us/congress-budget-debate.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 55. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Thomas Kaplan, Government Shutdown Begins as 
Budget Talks Falter in Senate, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/01/19/us/politics/senate-showdown-government-shutdown-trump.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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constituting just a one-day furlough.56 And the Democrats essentially 
folded without winning any concrete concessions.57 So much for hardball. 
The 2018–2019 shutdown is clearly the result of Trump playing 
hardball. He rejected the status quo of continuing resolutions in favor of 
funding for a wall on the U.S.– Mexican border. As Trump told Senate 
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer and then-House Minority Leader Nancy 
Pelosi, “I will be the one to shut it down. I’m not going to blame you for 
it.”58 
One more historical point: Bernstein actually did not go back far 
enough. In 1879, as a result of ex-Confederates in Congress trying to 
force out the remaining federal troops and end protections for African 
Americans in the South after Reconstruction, the federal government 
faced the very real threat of a shutdown. Historian Heather Cox 
Richardson writes: 
In 1879, ex-Confederates in Congress, desperate to turn the 
direction of the nation, refused to fund the government unless 
the Republican president promised to abandon his party and do 
things their way. Republicans then saw the situation for what it 
was. “If this is not revolution,” House Minority Leader James 
Garfield concluded, “which if persisted in will destroy the 
government, [then] I am wholly wrong in my conception of 
both the word and the thing.”59 
In the end, President Rutherford Hayes refused to capitulate to the racist 
Southern ex-secessionists and the Democrats caved.60 This shutdown 
fight followed the same pattern, with one side trying to use shutdowns to 
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 60. See id. (“Five times, Hayes vetoed the bill with the riders and, as popular opinion 
swung behind him, the Democrats backed down. . . . [The shutdown standoff] destroyed 
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change the status quo—in this case, the pro-South Democrats. They 
shouldered the blame and they failed. 
At what point can shutdown tactics cross over from hardball to 
beanball? The Democrats of 1879 were playing beanball by using 
shutdowns for racist and secessionist—fundamentally antidemocratic—
goals. If a shutdown is motivated by a desire to sabotage the government 
itself—perhaps to make an ideological point about minimizing the size 
and scope of the federal government, or alternatively with racist purposes 
lying behind either symbolic or concrete goals —it is beanball. 
In the big picture, after recognizing the 1981–1990 period for the 
minor preview that it was, we now have three extended Republican 
shutdowns (1995–1996, 2013, and 2018–2019) compared with one 
Democratic shutdown lasting a single day (2018). Trump’s backing down 
from a shutdown and instead declaring an emergency for the wall is 
consistent with this interpretation for which side was responsible for 
escalating the conflict, but as I discuss below, the emergency declaration 
is constitutional hardball, not beanball. 
B.  Obama Versus the Tea Party on Shutdowns, the Debt Ceiling, and 
Birtherism 
Bernstein’s response highlights President Obama’s engagement in 
hardball, and indeed he raises some good examples. But these examples 
actually underscore the reciprocal nature of constitutional hardball 
without undermining Fishkin and Pozen’s thesis that while both parties 
play hardball, the Republicans have played harder—asymmetric constitutional 
hardball. Obama’s hardball can be understood only in the context of 
Republican escalations of both hardball and beanball. 
Bernstein offers some noteworthy examples of Obama’s hardball.61 
Particularly intriguing is the Obama Administration’s nonexecution of 
statutes, from delays and waivers of ACA provisions, and the implemen-
tation of DACA, to refusing to defend the Defense of Marriage Act in 
court. New research shows that discussion of the “faithful execution” 
language in the Constitution’s Take Care Clause and the presidential 
oath has overlooked the language’s origins in English and colonial 
history that raise new questions about whether a President can ignore 
and categorically not enforce statutes.62 However, Obama is certainly not 
the first or last President to have a nonexecution problem. The rapidly 
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increasing use of presidential signing statements from Reagan, Bush Sr., 
Clinton, and Bush Jr. raised this concern,63 and Trump’s nonexecution of 
the ACA has escalated it.64 
Bernstein offers long passages from Obama’s Cabinet meetings and 
2014 State of the Union address in which the President signals that he 
will use “executive orders” and “administrative actions” to promote his 
policies, “if Congress won’t act soon.”65 But there was nothing unusual in 
these comments. Obama wasn’t threatening in these examples to ignore 
or disobey Congress or to go beyond statutory authorization. These speeches 
reflected basic, conventional governance in the post–New Deal admin-
istrative state. If Bernstein thinks these are examples of hardball, then he 
probably regards the entire bipartisan construction of the administrative 
state over the past century as constitutional hardball. But then why single 
out Obama for blame? 
Bernstein offers other examples of Obama Administration hardball 
which actually pale in comparison to Republican hardball tactics in those 
very same spheres. For example, Bernstein discusses politicized hiring in 
DOJ’s Civil Rights Division under Obama66 but fails to mention George 
W. Bush’s far bigger DOJ scandal, the firing of U.S. Attorneys for 
insidiously partisan reasons. In 2006, nine U.S. Attorneys were relieved of 
their duties. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and other White House 
officials were alleged to have fired four prosecutors for investigating 
Republican politicians and two others for not investigating Democratic 
politicians.67 Although a report by DOJ’s Inspector General did not 
definitively identify political retaliation as the reason behind the firings,68 
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 68. See Office of the Inspector Gen. & Office of Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006, at 331–36 (2008) 
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it noted gaps in the investigation because of the White House’s refusal to 
turn over internal documents or to allow certain officials to be 
interviewed,69  and concluded that there was “significant evidence that 
political partisan considerations were an important factor” in the 
firings.70 
Also in 2006, U.S. Attorney Steven Biskupic prosecuted Georgia 
Thompson, a career civil servant in Wisconsin, for allegedly steering a 
state contract to a travel agency owned by supporters of Democratic 
Governor Jim Doyle. 71  Thompson’s conviction for mail fraud and 
misapplication of federal funds became a centerpiece in the Republican 
campaign against Doyle.72 A year later, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned the conviction, finding that the prosecution’s case was 
“preposterous” and without evidence, that the agency had submitted the 
lowest bid, that there was “not so much as of a whiff of . . . impropriety,” 
and that Thompson was “innocent.”73 The court ordered her immediate 
release.74 It turns out that in 2005, Biskupic had been on a list of U.S. 
Attorneys to be considered for firing, compiled by the U.S. Attorney 
General’s chief of staff, allegedly for not bringing voter fraud cases 
against Democrats.75 After Biskupic indicted Thompson, his name came 
off of that list.76 Bush and Gonzales’s hardball abuses of the DOJ were so 
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egregious and such an abuse of power in relation to basic democratic 
values that they crossed the line over to beanball. And Trump makes 
those abuses look like wiffle ball. 
Bernstein is right that Democrats engaged in hardball tactics by 
passing the ACA over a Republican filibuster, making recess appointments, 
appointing “czars” to avoid Senate confirmation, and fighting over 
filibusters on judicial nominees.77 But these hardball tactics were each a 
response to the Republican hardball of escalating the filibuster to new 
heights.78 Tit for tat. On this question there may be rough symmetry, 
although one might still note that Republican use of the filibuster 
became common in all spheres. And while Obama found three areas in 
which to circumvent the filibuster, he couldn’t, or wouldn’t, circumvent it 
elsewhere. Moreover, “czars” and recess appointments were not new 
phenomena.79 It is also notable how long Obama and Senator Reid 
took—five years—to address the filibuster of judicial nominees.80 
But on top of the filibuster, Obama had to deal with two other 
remarkable kinds of hardball: one financial, the other xenophobic. First, 
Republicans threatened not to raise the debt ceiling in 2011, threatening 
the United States with default on its debts.81 This was an unprecedented 
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hardball threat that led to the downgrading of the United States’ credit 
rating and, if the Republicans had followed through, would have 
permanently damaged the American financial system.82 Obama could 
have circumvented Congress with constitutional hardball by relying on 
the Fourteenth Amendment,83 by asserting emergency powers to resolve 
conflicting legislation,84 or even by minting a trillion-dollar coin.85 However, 
he declined to go down that unprecedented path. Instead, he called the 
Republican bluff. It was one of the most striking episodes of hardball in 
the past three decades, and Fishkin and Pozen discussed it six times.86 
Bernstein didn’t mention it once. 
Obama also had to deal with a bizarre type of constitutional hardball: 
the birther conspiracy. It was a paradigmatic kind of constitutional hardball: 
weaponizing a clause of the Constitution, the “natural born citizen” 
requirement.87 But it was also oddball hardball, a delusional and baseless 
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 85. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Mint the Coin, Slate (Sept. 27, 2013), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2013/01/_1_trillion_platinum_coin_the_debt_ce
iling_standoff_can_be_averted_with.html [https://perma.cc/6DLM-EJT5] (arguing that 31 
U.S.C. § 5112(k) (2012) empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to mint a platinum coin of any 
denomination). 
 86. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 929, 932–33, 938, 947 n.123, 961, 978. 
 87. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be 
eligible to the Office of President . . . .”). 
2019] HARDBALL VS. BEANBALL 103 
 
conspiracy theory driven by President Obama’s race, which made him an 
illegitimate “other.” It is also better understood as a kind of constitutional 
beanball, a tactic to delegitimize through appeals to racism. It started as a 
fringe conspiracy, promoted by the likes of Judge Roy Moore88 and later 
Sheriff Joe Arpaio89 but more establishment Republican politicians made 
it mainstream in 2009 with a mix of coy questions, hints, and validating 
off-hand comments, including vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin,90 
then-Congressman (and now Senator) Roy Blunt,91  Senator Richard 
Shelby, 92  Senator David Vitter, 93  Congresswoman Michele Bachmann, 94 
                                                                                                                           
 88. See Andrew Kaczynski & Paul LeBlanc, GOP Senate Candidate Roy Moore Has 
Said He Doesn’t Believe Obama Is a Natural-Born Citizen, CNN (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/22/politics/kfile-roy-moore-birther-comments/index.html 
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 89. Matthew Hendley, Joe Arpaio Really Thinks President Obama’s Birth Certificate Is 
Fake, Phx. New Times (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/joe-
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believe . . . that President Barack Obama’s long-form birth certificate released by the White 
House on April, 27, 2011, is a computer-generated forgery,’ Arpaio said at a press 
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origins of the birther conspiracy theory to “innuendo by serial Illinois political candidate 
Andy Martin, who painted Obama as a closet Muslim in 2004”). 
 90. See Garance Franke-Ruta, Palin Flirts with Obama Birth Certificate Question, 
Wash. Post (Dec. 4, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/palin-flirts-
with-obama-birth.html [https://perma.cc/W6K4-69DU] (“Former Alaska governor Sarah 
Palin gave support . . . to a conspiracy theory promoted by fringe groups, that President 
Obama may not have an American birth certificate, saying, ‘I think the public rightfully is 
still making it an issue.’”). 
 91. See David Weigel, And Now, Roy Blunt, Wash. Indep. (July 29, 2009), https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20090802212412/http://washingtonindependent.com/53127/and-
now-roy-blunt [https://perma.cc/RNA3-KGLJ] (“What I don’t know is why the President 
can’t produce a birth certificate. I don’t know anybody else that can’t produce one. And I 
think that’s a legitimate question.” (quoting Roy Blunt)). 
 92. See Derek Price, Shelby’s Office Calls Times Report ‘Distortion,’ Cullman Times 
(Feb. 23, 2009), https://www.cullmantimes.com/community/shelby-s-office-calls-times-
report-distortion/article_3e804a7b-480f-52ce-97b6-fa5a002eb697.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“When asked . . . whether there was any truth to the rumor that 
Obama was not a . . . citizen, Shelby said, ‘Well his father was Kenyan and they said he was 
born in Hawaii, but I haven’t seen any birth certificate. You have to be born in America to 
be president.’”). 
 93. See Ben Evans, Republican Senator Says He Backs Birther Lawsuits, Bos. Globe 
(July 13, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/07/ 
13/republican_senator_says_he_backs_birther_lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/CKK8-Y2HP] 
(“Republican Sen. David Vitter of Louisiana says he supports conservative organizations 
challenging President Barack Obama’s citizenship in court.”). 
 94. See Kendra Marr, Bachmann: No Birth Flap for Me, Politico (Mar. 14, 2011), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2011/03/bachmann-no-birth-flap-for-me-051245 [https:// 
perma.cc/9RFB-XVF5] (“[Bachmann] says she’d quickly establish her constitutional 
qualifications if she launches a White House bid. . . . Bachmann has previously sidestepped 
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Congressman Mike Coffman,95 and Newt Gingrich,96 among others. Then, 
of course, Donald Trump emerged as the Birther-in-Chief as his entry 
into American politics in 2011 and eventually rode that racist conspiracy 
theory to a racist presidential campaign.97 On the one hand, prior 
Republican presidential nominees John McCain and Mitt Romney 
admirably never made a major campaign issue of Reverend Jeremiah 
Wright,98 when it could have been a divisive racial theme.99 But in the 
2012 election, at a time when birtherism was Trump’s sole political 
message, Romney sought out Trump’s endorsement—a validation of the 
birther message and a pitch for those racist votes. 100  Romney was 
                                                                                                                           
opportunities to shoot down the so-called birther movement, rooted in discredited rumors 
that Obama is not a natural-born citizen.”). 
 95. See Mike Coffman Says Obama “Not an American” at Heart, then Apologizes, 
Denver Post (May 16, 2012), https://www.denverpost.com/2012/05/16/mike-coffman-
says-obama-not-an-american-at-heart-then-apologizes/ [https://perma.cc/JZ5T-CPTF] (“I 
don’t know whether Barack Obama was born in the United States of America. I don’t know 
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American.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coffman)). 
 96. See Robert Costa, Gingrich: Obama’s ‘Kenyan, Anti-Colonial’ Worldview, Nat’l 
Rev.: Corner (Sept. 12, 2010), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/gingrich-obamas-
kenyan-anti-colonial-worldview-robert-costa/ [https://perma.cc/FHZ9-MGD3] (“What if 
[Obama] is so outside our comprehension, that only if you understand Kenyan, anti-
colonial behavior, can you begin to piece together [his actions]?  . . . That is the most 
accurate, predictive model for his behavior.” (first and second alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gingrich)). 
 97. See Chris Megerian, What Donald Trump Has Said Through the Years About Where 
President Obama Was Born, L.A. Times (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/ 
politics/la-na-pol-trump-birther-timeline-20160916-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7BLL-
8SGW] (explaining that Trump began promoting the birther conspiracy in spring 2011, as 
he was considering a run for the presidency in the 2012 election). 
 98. In spring 2008, ABC News aired portions of incendiary sermons given by 
Reverend Wright, Barack Obama’s pastor of twenty years. Emerging in the middle of the 
presidential campaign, “this episode garnered major media coverage and caused a 
national uproar.” Brian D. McKenzie, Barack Obama, Jeremiah Wright, and Public 
Opinion in the 2008 Presidential Primaries, 32 Pol. Psychol. 943, 944 (2011). 
 99. See Anna Schecter, Eric Longabardi & Brian Ross, Watch: Rev. Wright TV Ad that 
McCain Would Not Run, ABC (Dec. 8, 2008), https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Vote2008/ 
story?id=6395775&page=1 [https://perma.cc/X5AN-FK7K] (“Even as his campaign fell 
far behind in the polls, Sen. John McCain refused to authorize the use of a fully-produced 
30-second television commercial that criticized Barack Obama for his relationship with the 
controversial pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright.”); Donovan Slack & Patrick Reis, Romney 
Repudiates Jeremiah Wright Plan, Politico (May 17, 2012), https://www.politico.com/ 
blogs/politico44/2012/05/romney-repudiates-jeremiah-wright-plan-123737 [https://perma.cc/ 
K96N-LSJ9] (“Mitt Romney’s campaign says it wants no part of a plan by Republican 
strategists to attack President Obama by highlighting his ties to pastor Jeremiah Wright.”). 
 100. See James Hohmann, Pataki Not Running—Perry Talking with Trump—Romney, 
Bachmann Staying the Course—Huntsman’s Purple Tie—Kimball: Never Quit—GOP 
Turning on Palin, Politico: Morning Score (Aug. 26, 2011), https://www.politico.com/ 
tipsheets/morning-score/2011/08/pataki-not-running-perry-talking-with-trump-romney-
bachmann-staying-the-course-huntsmans-purple-tie-kimball-never-quit-gop-turning-on-palin-
005952 [https://perma.cc/3HJM-YECE] (quoting Trump’s then-lawyer Michael Cohen as 
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enthusiastic: “There are some things that you just can’t imagine happening 
in your life . . . . This is one of them. Being in Donald Trump’s magnificent 
hotel and having his endorsement is a delight. I’m so honored and 
pleased to have his endorsement.”101 
When John McCain was told by a voter in 2008, “I can’t trust Obama. 
I have read about him, and he’s not, he’s not uh—he’s an Arab,” McCain 
responded, “No, ma’am,” and immediately rejected such conspiracies.102 
McCain might have won in 2008 with his own version of Willie Horton 
ads starring Reverend Wright, but he chose his dignity and legacy over an 
increased chance of victory.103 
But Romney did the opposite. He sought out the Birther-in-Chief for 
a coded, yet unmistakable, symbolic embrace of birther votes. It was un-
acceptable at the time and is only more so in hindsight, as birtherism 
prefigured the Trump campaign’s white nationalist messaging. In doing 
so Romney wasn’t just playing aggressive hardball; he was playing 
illegitimate beanball. Obama had to overcome the unusual challenge of 
being delegitimized as an American while trying to govern as President. 
In fact, the birther strategy had the effect of constraining Obama’s 
range of political options.104 He had to play nicer, given the stereotypes 
and the politics of race reinforced by this bad-faith conspiracy theory.105 
One of the definitive critiques of Obama’s presidency by the left was that 
                                                                                                                           
saying that Romney’s overtures demonstrated “the power that Trump controls or that 
Trump maintains with the American people, as now the current frontrunner is clearly 
seeking Mr. Trump’s endorsement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 101. Reid J. Epstein, Trump Endorses Mitt, Politico (Feb. 2, 2012), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2012/02/trump-to-endorse-mitt-072365 [https://perma.cc/AL4C-AA8U] (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Jonathan Martin & Amie Parnes, McCain: Obama Not an Arab, Crowd Boos, 
Politico (Oct. 10, 2008), https://www.politico.com/story/2008/10/mccain-obama-not-an-
arab-crowd-boos-014479 [https://perma.cc/2ZWT-2PNF] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. In 1988, an independent campaign committee aired ads supporting George H.W. 
Bush’s presidential campaign that featured “Willie Horton, a convicted murderer who had 
received a weekend furlough from prison under a Massachusetts program supported by 
then-governor Michael Dukakis [Bush’s opponent], only to commit rape and armed 
robbery. The ad . . . played perfectly on white voters’ racialized fears about violent crime.” 
Zachary Roth, The Great Suppression: Voting Rights, Corporate Cash, and the Conservative 
Assault on Democracy 56 (2016). 
 104. See Adam Serwer, The Nationalist’s Delusion, Atlantic (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/the-nationalists-delusion/546356/ 
[https://perma.cc/A7E2-A74C] (“‘[Y]ou can draw a straight line between Obama and 
heightened racialization, and the emergence of Trump,’ [political scientist Michael] Tesler 
told me. ‘Birtherism, the idea that Obama’s a Muslim, anti-Muslim sentiments—these are 
very strong components of Trump’s rise, and really what makes him popular . . . in the first 
place.’”). 
 105. See id. (explaining how Obama was uniquely “ill-equipped to stem the tide” of 
nativism because “the people he needs to speak to see him as the problem”). 
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he did not answer the Republican hardball with hardball.106 But Obama’s 
critics on the right often want it both ways: They want to portray him as 
weak and soft, but also as a dangerous, nefarious, and lawless threat. I 
suppose one could be both, but it strains credulity to suggest Obama was 
a remarkably aggressive practitioner of hardball in this era. He was not 
only less aggressive than other Presidents before and after, he was less 
aggressive than his Republican opponents at the time. 
C.  The Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Bernstein also has legitimate complaints about how the Obama 
Administration pursued the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Fishkin and Pozen did 
not address. Bernstein is correct that the Administration lied about the 
process and engaged in questionable spin and problematic tactics.107 But 
there are a number of problems with his analysis in this context. Again, 
Fishkin and Pozen acknowledge that Democrats play hardball but argue 
that they have not done so as aggressively as Republicans. Bernstein’s 
example of Obama’s most aggressive foreign policy hardball pales in 
comparison to the George W. Bush Administration’s lies about weapons 
of mass destruction in pursuit of the Iraq War,108 and to the string of lies 
and chaos in Trump’s foreign policy.109 The word “Iraq” does not appear 
in Bernstein’s piece, but the discussion of the JCPOA takes up eleven of 
his twenty-six pages.110 This seems like a highly selective complaint, one 
made without the context and comparativism that are the point of 
Fishkin and Pozen’s essay. One can certainly argue that lies in pursuit of a 
peace plan, while problematic, are not as egregious as lies in pursuit of 
war. It is remarkable that Bernstein focuses so narrowly on the Obama 
Administration’s lies while ignoring the “asymmetric” lying of the 
Republican administrations immediately before and after. 
The most constitutional of hardball questions the Iran agreement 
raises is whether the JCPOA should have been a treaty subject to Senate 
ratification; to Bernstein’s credit, he cites experts who say that it did not 
                                                                                                                           
 106. See, e.g., David Coates, Reflections on the Obama Presidency: The Price of 
Moderation, HuffPost (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-coates/ 
reflections-on-the-obama_b_13579602.html [https://perma.cc/ZB9B-JWTL] (providing 
progressive critiques of President Obama for being too timid). 
 107. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 223–32. 
 108. See, e.g., infra note 126 and accompanying text. See generally Charles Lewis, 935 
Lies: The Future of Truth and the Decline of America’s Moral Integrity, at xiii (2014) 
(describing how George W. Bush and seven top Bush Administration officials “made at 
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 109. See, e.g., Stephen M. Walt, Does It Matter that Trump Is a Liar?, Foreign Pol’y 
(Sept. 17, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/17/does-it-matter-that-trump-is-a-
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 110. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 222–32. 
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need to be.111 He also notes that Senator Tom Cotton and his Senate 
colleagues reacted dramatically: 
By early 2015, some speculated that the Obama 
Administration’s plan was to get the United Nations Security 
Council to endorse a deal and then present the deal to 
Congress and the public as binding international law. This 
provoked Senator Tom Cotton to write an open letter signed by 
forty-seven Senators informing the Iranian government that any 
deal signed by Obama but not approved by Congress would not 
be binding U.S. law.112 
This letter was condemned from many quarters—sometimes hyperbolically 
as being traitorous or mutinous, but also with some valid concerns that it 
crossed the line legally.113 Some commentators cited the Logan Act,114 a 
statute that prosecutors have used only twice to indict someone, but a 
legal line nevertheless.115 Conservative columnist Michael Gerson observed: 
If Republican senators want to make the point that an Iran deal 
requires a treaty, they should make that case to the American 
people, not to the Iranians. Congress simply has no business 
conducting foreign policy with a foreign government, especially 
an adversarial one. Every Republican who pictures his or her 
feet up on the Resolute Desk should fear this precedent.116 
                                                                                                                           
 111. See id. at 225 n.91 (citing Jack Goldsmith, More Weak Arguments for the 
Illegality of the Iran Deal, Lawfare (July 27, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-
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9, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/03/09/gop-iran-letter-might-be-unconstitutional-is-
it-also-criminal/ [https://perma.cc/D8NU-S8YU] (“Most putative Logan Act violations 
violate the spirit and structural foundations of the Logan Act . . . . This one seems to 
squarely satisfy its elements. . . . [A]n initiative like the Cotton letter seems to cross a line, 
and perhaps it should be slapped back.”); see also Wilson C. Freeman, Cong. Research 
Serv., LSB10058, The Logan Act: An Overview of a Sometimes Forgotten 18th Century 
Law 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10058.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCB8-
BBDT] (“Prosecutors have only brought two Logan Act indictments since its enactment, 
neither of which led to conviction.”). 
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Did Obama push boundaries in pursuing a nuclear nonproliferation 
agreement? Yes. But could he plausibly be accused of committing a crime? 
No.117 This is not to suggest that Republican senators should have been 
prosecuted. But it is remarkable that some mainstream commentators 
could entertain the question of whether Republican senators had 
committed a crime and that commentators across the political spectrum 
identified this act as a serious breach of foreign policy norms. Some of 
the critiques may have been hyperbole, but the Senate Republicans 
crossed a line, and their letter to Iran was indicative of the fervor, 
intransigence, and ideological opposition that help explain why the 
Obama Administration chose to hide, lie, and misrepresent parts of the 
process. Furthermore, it seems unremarkable that an administration would 
hide or lie about whether highly sensitive diplomatic negotiations were 
happening, especially when the opposition was engaging in such tactics. 
Were the Republicans’ fervor, intransigence, and ideological opposition 
warranted? No, they were not. And was a nuclear agreement so urgent and 
necessary as to justify hardball tactics in anticipation of such ardent 
opposition? In a word, yes. The reasons for the urgency were so sensitive 
in diplomatic terms that any administration would need to hide them in 
order to get a deal done. And because of this sensitivity they have not 
been discussed widely in American media, but national-security and 
Israeli experts have explained how the international coalition for tight 
sanctions on Iran was inevitably dissolving.118 Reasonable people can 
disagree on this issue, but reasonable people should also acknowledge some 
often-overlooked facts forcing the Obama Administration’s hand. 
This Reply is not the place to fully litigate the merits of the Iran 
agreement, but a brief sketch of the issues is necessary context to answer 
Bernstein’s complaints. The bottom line is that an international agreement 
initially put sanctions in place not because of Iran’s support of terrorism 
but because of its military nuclear program.119 Russia and China had 
been the most reluctant members of the coalition.120 Once Iran announced 
that it was willing to abandon its military uranium-enrichment program 
and accept frequent inspections the sanctions regime was not going to 
last. The choice the Obama Administration faced was between ineffective 
sanctions with essentially no inspections, on the one hand, or an 
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Back, Foreign Pol’y (July 25, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/25/moscow-and-
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internationally supervised inspection regime with rules for re-imposing 
sanctions on the other. Hardin Lang, a senior fellow at the Center for 
American Progress, and retired Israeli general Shlomo Brom, a senior 
fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a 
visiting fellow at the Center for American Progress, provide some behind-
the-scenes realities: 
[Myth:] The United States could have held out for a better 
deal.  
[Reality:] This is a strong deal, negotiated between the major 
world powers and Iran. If the United States walks away, the hard-
won international consensus on current sanctions would 
crumble. Russia and China would reopen trade with Iran, 
circumventing American and European sanctions. Inspectors 
would be kicked out, and Iran would have no effective 
restrictions on its nuclear program.121 
Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. Middle East negotiator, now a vice 
president of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, adds: 
At best both the Russians and the Chinese never saw the Iranian 
nuclear program in as dire terms as the U.S. did. And the 
Germans were eager to resume their trade ties with Iran as well. 
Israel was reluctant to use force on its own. And the Iranian 
regime would have continued on its resistance economy—pain 
notwithstanding—unless it could justify a good deal for itself. In 
a galaxy far away, a better deal might have been possible, but 
not here on planet Earth and not under these circumstances.122 
The Obama Administration could not publicly blame its diplomatic 
allies in the midst of these sensitive negotiations. When Iran announced 
its compliance, the reality was that Russia and China were going to end 
their participation in sanctions, thereby ending the sanctions’ effectiveness 
and opening the door for other countries to drop sanctions too. Russia 
and China wanted access to Iranian oil, and Iran’s willingness to end its 
military nuclear program was sufficient excuse to get that oil.123 Moreover, 
according to some reports, Germany was also signaling it would back off 
of sanctions.124 The Obama Administration chose to be diplomatic in 
negotiating a new inspection regime, rather than publicly blaming 
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Russia, China, and Germany. It would have been easy to score political 
points against these countries, but the blame game could have weakened 
or killed the deal. The choice for the Obama Administration was not the 
status quo sanctions regime versus a deal. The choice was either China 
and Russia ending sanctions and leaving very weak safeguards or an 
American-led deal with strong safeguards.125 The Obama Administration 
made a weak position stronger. In this context, more of the Obama 
Administration’s secrecy and even its lies and misrepresentations in the 
course of its international negotiations are understandable. And even 
though Bernstein is right that the Obama Administration played 
hardball, this episode doesn’t hold a yellow-cake uranium candle or a 
Russian oil flame to the misrepresentations of the Bush and Trump 
Administrations in foreign policy.126 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BEANBALL 
Some hardball goes too far and becomes antidemocratic. At that point, 
it becomes beanball: more than just an aggressive, yet legitimate, style of 
play. Beanball breaks basic rules by trying to eliminate the other players 
from the game. 
The paradigmatic example is efforts to suppress voting and restrict 
ballot access. Once upon a time, beanball of this type consisted of formal 
disenfranchisement. Today, this form of beanball is less explicit, instead 
taking the form of voting rules designed to disadvantage the opponents’ 
voters. As Zachary Roth’s The Great Suppression documents, Republican 
officials openly talk about the good old days when the franchise was far 
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K3NC-FX5J] (investigating the origins of false evidence that purported to prove the 
existence of a secret Iraqi nuclear program, which the Bush Administration cited to justify 
its 2003 invasion). For a more technical defense that Bush did not lie, see Brooks Jackson, 
Bush’s “16 Words” on Iraq & Uranium: He May Have Been Wrong but He Wasn’t Lying, 
FactCheck (July 26, 2004), https://www.factcheck.org/2004/07/bushs-16-words-on-iraq-
uranium/ [https://perma.cc/Y72F-X8UV]. For a discussion of the United States’ loss of 
foreign policy credibility during the Trump Administration, see Keren Yarhi-Milo, After 
Credibility: American Foreign Policy in the Trump Era, Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-12-12/after-credibility (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
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more restricted. Congressman Ted Yoho of Florida in 2012, for example: 
“I’ve had some radical ideas about voting, and it’s probably not a good 
time to tell you about them . . . . But you used to have to be a property 
owner to vote.”127 Roth notes that this was the same state in which limited 
resources for casting and counting ballots led to the “recount fiasco” in 
the 2000 presidential election. 128  I’d add that even though Florida 
officials made many mistakes and Florida state judges did not inspire 
confidence, the Florida recount in 2000 illustrated Republicans playing a 
mix of hardball and beanball more aggressively than Democrats in terms 
of providing resources for voting and actually counting votes. Those 
problems unsurprisingly recurred in the 2018 Florida races for Senate 
and governor.129 The scandal in North Carolina over stolen absentee 
ballots130 and in Georgia by gubernatorial candidate and Secretary of 
State Brian Kemp’s self-dealing131 show these problems tend to have a 
partisan bent and seem to be getting worse. 
For the past three decades, Republicans have tried to make access to 
the ballot and counting votes harder, while Democrats have tried to make 
access and counting easier.132 Some of these efforts, while imprudent, are 
                                                                                                                           
 127. Roth, supra note 103, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Greg 
Sargent, An Uncivil War: Taking Back Our Democracy in an Age of Trumpian 
Disinformation and Thunderdome Politics 37–44 (2018) (describing modern voter-
suppression tactics). 
 128. See Roth, supra note 103, at 2. 
 129. See David Smiley, How Florida’s Clear-Cut 2018 Midterms Devolved into a 
Recount Sequel, Miami Herald (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 
politics-government/state-politics/article221815280.html [https://perma.cc/KS2S-XCE4] 
(providing an overview of the recounts in Florida’s 2018 gubernatorial and U.S. Senate 
elections). 
 130. In North Carolina’s Ninth Congressional District, the Republican candidate—and 
apparent winner of the 2018 election—Mark Harris, was not seated because of evidence 
that a contractor hired by his campaign engaged in an absentee-ballot-fraud scheme that 
may have affected the election’s outcome. See Amy Gardner & Beth Reinhard, N.C. 
Congressional Candidate Sought Out Aide, Despite Warnings over Tactics, Wash. Post 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nc-congressional-candidate-
sought-out-aide-despite-warnings-of-voting-irregularities/2018/12/13/daea8338-fca1-11e8-
83c0-b06139e540e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZSZ4-KBYZ]. After an investigation, the 
state board of elections ultimately ordered that a new election take place. See Alan 
Blinder, New Election Ordered in North Carolina Race at Center of Fraud Inquiry, N.Y. 
Times (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/us/mark-harris-nc-voter-
fraud.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 131. See Carol Anderson, Brian Kemp’s Lead in Georgia Needs an Asterisk, Atlantic 
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/georgia-governor-
kemp-abrams/575095/ [https://perma.cc/X5HT-Q33Z] (arguing that Brian Kemp’s 
oversight of an election he was himself running violates “the most fundamental principle 
of democratic elections—that the electoral process be managed by an independent and 
impartial election authority” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting President 
Jimmy Carter)). 
 132. See Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 629, 631 (2018) (“Th[e] emergence of ‘red state election law’ and ‘blue 
state election law’ has meant that many states with Republican majorities have passed laws 
112 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 119:85 
 
arguably theoretically legitimate. Many on the left criticize voter-
identification rules,133 but in the abstract, such rules are legitimate, even 
if in-person voter fraud is only a myth.134 In our fragmented, distrusting 
social environment, some will doubt the validity of election results 
without voter ID rules. Voter ID helps to address those concerns and 
makes election results appear fair and legitimate.135 The inevitable problem 
is the leap from theory to beanball practice. In practice, Republicans 
have been turning voter ID and other new voting rules into the new poll 
tax. Republican state legislatures spread voter ID laws rapidly from 2004 
to 2016,136 often with rules that specifically benefited likely Republican 
voters over likely Democrats.137 In Tennessee, for example, valid voter ID 
includes state-issued driver’s licenses, U.S. passports, military IDs, and 
handgun carry permits with a photo, but not college student IDs.138 
Similarly, Texans can use gun permit licenses to vote but not student 
                                                                                                                           
making it harder to register and vote, and those states with Democratic majorities have 
passed laws making it easier to register and vote.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Democratic Platform Comm., 2016 Democratic Party Platform 22 (2016), 
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2S9G-86KT] (“[W]e will continue to fight against discriminatory voter 
identification laws, which disproportionately burden young voters, diverse communities, 
people of color, low-income families, people with disabilities, the elderly, and women.”). 
 134. See infra note 143. 
 135. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 197 (2008) (“[Indiana’s] 
interest in protecting public confidence ‘in the integrity and legitimacy of representative 
government’ [justifies its voter ID law] . . . because it encourages citizen participation in 
the democratic process . . . [and public confidence requires that] ‘safeguards exist to deter 
or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.’” (citation omitted) (first quoting Brief 
for State Respondents at 53, Crawford, 553 U.S. 181 (Nos. 07-21, 07-25), 2007 WL 4232930; 
then quoting Comm’n on Fed. Election Reform, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections 
1618 (2005), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Exhibit%20M.PDF [https://perma.cc/7RRB-
KSZU])). But see Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the 
Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification 
Requirements, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1737, 1754 (2008) (“Even if . . . fears [of voter fraud] do 
not reduce people’s likelihood of voting, . . . voter ID laws [might be] worth supporting if 
they bolster public confidence. However, the data that exist on the relationship between 
voter ID laws and fears of fraud do not support even this more modest argument.”). 
 136. See Jasmine C. Lee, How States Moved Toward Stricter Voter ID Laws, N.Y. Times 
(Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/03/us/elections/how-
states-moved-toward-stricter-voter-id-laws.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 137. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, 
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 
57, 106 (2017) (“Many academic studies have concluded that the new voting restrictions 
represent a Republican strategy to mitigate the political influence of minority voters 
aligned with the Democratic Party.”). 
 138. See What ID Is Required When Voting?, Tenn. Sec’y of State, https://sos.tn.gov/ 
products/elections/what-id-required-when-voting [https://perma.cc/3B6J-XUH7] (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2019). 
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IDs.139 According to the Brennan Center for Justice, approximately eleven 
percent of American citizens do not have government-issued photo ID, 
with a disproportionate number of people of color, seniors, and young 
people lacking such documentation.140 Judge Richard Posner, who wrote 
the Seventh Circuit decision that upheld Indiana’s voter ID law,141 has 
since disavowed voter ID laws as a kind of “voter suppression.”142 Given 
that widespread, in-person voter fraud is a myth,143 it should not serve as 
a pretext for such vote rigging, even if voter ID legislation addresses 
some conspiratorial suspicions. The 2016 election had more widespread 
                                                                                                                           
 139. See Required Identification for Voting in Person, Tex. Sec’y of State, https:// 
www.votetexas.gov/register-to-vote/need-id.html [https://perma.cc/5KGM-A2LX] (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2019). 
 140. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Citizens Without Proof: A Survey of Americans’ 
Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification 3 (2006), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_39242.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2T4N-XF8B]. 
 141. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 
181. 
 142. John Schwartz, Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/politics/judge-in-
landmark-case-disavows-support-for-voter-id.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(“Asked whether the court had gotten its ruling wrong, Judge Posner responded: ‘Yes. 
Absolutely.’ Back in 2007, . . . ‘we weren’t really given strong indications that requiring 
additional voter identification would actually disenfranchise people entitled to vote.’ The 
member of the three-judge panel who dissented . . . ‘was right’ . . . .”). 
 143. See Justin Levitt, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Truth About Voter Fraud 7 (2007), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20V
oter%20Fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QGA-X2GX] (“There have been a handful of 
substantiated cases of individual ineligible voters attempting to defraud the election 
system. But by any measure, voter fraud is extraordinarily rare.”); Lorraine C. Minnite, 
The Myth of Voter Fraud 129 (2010) (“I have established here that fraud itself is a 
relatively rare event. Rather, the problem is the myth of fraud that can influence the vote 
count and, more important, shapes the rules that erode voting rights.”); John S. Ahlquist, 
Kenneth R. Mayer & Simon Jackman, Alien Abduction and Voter Impersonation in the 
2012 U.S. General Election: Evidence from a Survey List Experiment, 13 Election L.J. 460, 
461 (2014) (“[W]e find no significant indicators of voter impersonation in the 2012 U.S. 
general election. We find no evidence of voter impersonation in contested states or among 
low income voters, subsets where vote fraud is alleged to be most common.”); Justin Levitt, 
A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible Incidents out of 
One Billion Ballots Cast, Wash. Post (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-voter-impersonation-finds-
31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/ [https://perma.cc/33K3-MMPY] (finding 
just thirty-one credible allegations of impersonation fraud in all “general, primary, special, 
and municipal elections” between 2000 and 2014); Heather Cox Richardson, ‘Voter 
Fraud’ Is a Myth that Helps Republicans Win, Even when Their Policies Aren’t Popular, 
Bos. Globe (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/10/23/voter-fraud-
myth-helps-republicans-win-even-when-their-policies-aren-popular/dqYDx92NkJ1Ia4nvX2LuiK/ 
story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (tracing the origins of the modern voter-
fraud myth to a political strategy launched by the Republican Party in 1986). 
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restrictions than ever, driven by a Republican agenda against ballot 
access.144 
Beyond voter ID, Republicans have several long-standing strategies 
to make voting more difficult in other ways. Republicans largely opposed 
the commonsense Motor Voter Act that would have made sense if their 
voter ID agenda was in good faith.145 Now Republicans employ a strategy 
of “voter caging,”146 purging from the rolls voters whose mail is returned 
as undeliverable.147 The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld this 
tactic—despite its lack of sufficient justification and all its obvious risks of 
selective enforcement.148 Republicans like Kris Kobach, Kansas’s former 
secretary of state, championed the Crosscheck system—which, by 2017, 
more than thirty states participated in—to challenge voter registrations 
by searching for duplicate names across different jurisdictions, ostensibly 
to hunt for fraud. 149  However, “academics and states that use the 
program have found that its results are overrun with false positives, 
creating a high risk of disenfranchising legal voters.”150 As Crosscheck 
flagged names, communities with more common shared names, like 
African Americans, Latinos, and Asians, are dramatically overrepresented 
                                                                                                                           
 144. See Gaughan, supra note 137, at 105–11 (arguing that Republican-enacted 
measures that make voting harder and remove voters from registration rolls represent a 
deliberate strategy for political advantage); Lee, supra note 136 (documenting the spread 
of voter ID laws through 2016). 
 145. The National Voter Registration Act of 1991 passed the Senate and House with 
primarily Democratic support but was vetoed by President George H. W. Bush. See President 
Vetoes the ‘Motor-Voter’ Measure, N.Y. Times (July 3, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
1992/07/03/us/the-1992-campaign-president-vetoes-the-motor-voter-measure.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). A subsequent version of the bill was later enacted into law 
as the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (2012)). 
 146. “Voter caging is the practice of sending mail to addresses on the voter rolls, 
compiling a list of the mail that is returned undelivered, and using that list to purge or 
challenge voters’ registrations [claiming] that the voters on the list do not legally reside at 
their registered addresses.” Justin Levitt & Andrew Allison, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, A 
Guide to Voter Caging 1 (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/ 
download_file_49608.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD2D-EH5L]. 
 147. See, e.g., Vann R. Newkirk II, The Republican Party Emerges from Decades of 
Court Supervision, Atlantic (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2018/01/the-gop-just-received-another-tool-for-suppressing-votes/550052/ [https://perma.cc/ 
H8YG-LQ8V] (describing the renewed use of voter caging schemes). 
 148. See Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018). 
 149. See Ari Berman, The Man Behind Trump’s Voter-Fraud Obsession, N.Y. Times 
Mag. (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/magazine/the-man-behind-
trumps-voter-fraud-obsession.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 150. Christopher Berman, This Anti-Voter-Fraud Program Gets It Wrong over 99 
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and run the risk of being disenfranchised.151 Even without Crosscheck, 
voter caging runs similar obvious risks of disenfranchising eligible voters. 
Georgia’s gubernatorial race in 2018 was the most notorious example of 
a white secretary of state, Brian Kemp, using these tools to rig an election 
over a black candidate, State Senator Stacey Abrams.152 The Georgia race 
also highlighted a widespread problem: Voting precincts serving more 
likely Democratic voters have worse technology, are less reliable, and 
have longer lines.153 
Republicans are also more likely to engage in, or reward, more 
direct minority-voter-suppression tactics. In a 2018 North Carolina 
congressional election, Republican operatives allegedly stole absentee 
ballots, with many of the apparent victims being elderly African American 
voters.154 In fact, the Trump DOJ had been given notice of such election 
fraud almost a year in advance, and did nothing to prevent it,155 all the 
while choosing to focus on in-person voter fraud propaganda and 
                                                                                                                           
 151. See Greg Palast, The GOP’s Stealth War Against Voters, Rolling Stone (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/the-gops-stealth-war-against-voters-247905/ 
[https://perma.cc/F3BB-UQZK] (“[T]he Crosscheck list disproportionately threatens 
solid Democratic constituencies: young, black, Hispanic and Asian-American voters—with 
some of the biggest possible purges underway in Ohio and North Carolina, two crucial 
swing states with tight Senate races.”). 
 152. As secretary of state, Kemp oversaw a sustained spike in purges from Georgia’s 
voter rolls, including a purge of 500,000 names in a single day in 2017, see Alan Judd, 
Georgia’s Strict Laws Lead to Large Purge of Voters, Atlanta J.-Const. (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/state–regional-govt–politics/voter-purge-begs-question-what-
the-matter-with-georgia/YAFvuk3Bu95kJIMaDiDFqJ/ [https://perma.cc/7CR8-GLFT]; held up 
over 53,000 predominantly black voter registration applications at the 2018 registration 
deadline, see Ben Nadler, Voting Rights Become a Flashpoint in Georgia Governor’s Race, 
Associated Press (Oct. 9, 2018), https://apnews.com/fb011f39af3b40518b572c8cce6e906c 
[https://perma.cc/M784-AFNJ]; and on the eve of the election, without evidence, accused 
Democrats of trying to hack into the state’s voter registration system, see Richard Fausset & 
Alan Blinder, Brian Kemp’s Office, Without Citing Evidence, Investigates Georgia Democrats 
over Alleged ‘Hack,’ N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
11/04/us/politics/georgia-elections-kemp-voters-hack.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 153. See Anna North, Why Long Lines at Polling Places Are a Voting Rights Issue, Vox 
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/6/18068506/midterm-election-voting-
lines-new-york-georgia [https://perma.cc/U75X-CGE3]. 
 154. See Gardner & Reinhard, supra note 130; Brianna Sacks & Otillia Steadman, 
Inside the North Carolina Republican Vote Machine: Cash, Pills—and Ballots, BuzzFeed 
News (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/briannasacks/dowless-britt-
inside-north-carolina-absentee-ballot-machine [https://perma.cc/5GZH-BVL7]. 
 155. See Michael Biesecker & Gary D. Robertson, North Carolina Asked Feds to Open 
Vote Fraud Case Last Year, Associated Press (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/ 
73c059acc31e4047a89cc0d1a8ce8710 [https://perma.cc/L2RP-UFSY]; Beth Reinhard, 
Justice Officials Were Briefed Months Ago on Allegations Against Operative at the Center of 
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scaremongering about noncitizens voting. Remarkably enough, President 
Trump nominated Thomas Farr, one such former alleged beanball player 
from North Carolina credibly accused of racially disenfranchising scare 
tactics, to the federal bench, and he was almost confirmed.156 
Fishkin and Pozen acknowledge a counterexample: Democrats have 
their own election-timing strategies, sometimes preferring to schedule an 
election off cycle to advantage Democratic turnout operations.157 But 
they note this practice is rare and it “would be the sort of exception that 
proves the rule. Whatever their drawbacks, off-cycle elections do not 
actually block . . . anyone . . . from voting. If this is as far as Democrats 
will go, it highlights the limits of their use of hardball in the highly 
contested constitutional sphere of voting.”158 I would go further and say 
that a comparison of these tactics shows that Democrats are generally 
reluctant to play hardball with voting rules, while Republicans have 
enthusiastically been playing beanball. These voter suppression tactics are 
likely to get far worse in 2020, particularly now that federal courts have 
lifted a consent decree forbidding the Republican National Committee 
from engaging in voter suppression efforts, as Professor Rick Hasen 
explains.159 The consent decree was put in place precisely because the 
RNC has a history of such tactics. What’s past is prologue. RNC voter 
suppression is dead; long live RNC voter suppression. 
Another example is extreme gerrymandering, more of a Republican 
project than a Democratic one.160 Yes, Maryland’s congressional seats were 
extremely gerrymandered,161 but for every Maryland, there is a Wisconsin,162 
                                                                                                                           
 156. Farr worked on Jesse Helms’s 1990 U.S. Senate campaign in North Carolina, 
which was investigated by DOJ for sending tens of thousands of intimidating postcards to 
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 157. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 938 n.98. 
 158. Id. at 939 n.98. 
 159. See Richard L. Hasen, Donald Trump Was Just Handed a Chance to Supercharge Voter 
Suppression in 2020, Slate (Jan. 8, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/ 
donald-trump-voter-suppression-plan-2020.html [https://perma.cc/KT8S-GC97] (“With 
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 160. In the 115th Congress, Republicans derived a net benefit of at least sixteen to 
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census. See Laura Royden & Michael Li, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Extreme Maps 1 (2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20Maps%205.
16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z98E-WQU7]. 
 161. See Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 497–98 (D. Md. 2018) (striking 
down Maryland’s congressional map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander favoring 
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a Pennsylvania,163 and a North Carolina.164 As Fishkin and Pozen noted, 
Republicans broke norms in Texas and Colorado by redistricting and 
gerrymandering mid-decade in 2003.165 But Republicans stepped up their 
efforts with the Republican State Leadership Committee and its 
Redistricting Majority Project, known as REDMAP.166 Using a mix of 
computer programs and extreme partisanship, Republicans engaged in a 
national state-by-state strategy of extreme gerrymanders, starting in North 
Carolina and moving to Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and 
Virginia.167 As a result, Republicans entrenched themselves and effectively 
marginalized Democratic voters, so that even when Democrats won 
statewide by large margins, the Republicans would keep the state 
legislature or the majority of congressional seats.168 This is not legitimate 
hardball. This is indefensible beanball. 
In the 2018 elections, voters in Wisconsin and Michigan replaced 
their Republican governors with Democratic ones.169 The Republican 
lame-duck legislatures then enacted a series of changes weakening the 
incoming governors and increasing the legislatures’ power.170 Wisconsin 
included measures to limit early voting to a two-week window, even 
though a federal court had previously found a similar move to be racially 
                                                                                                                           
 162. See Royden & Li, supra note 160, at 22, 25, 28 (showing a Republican skew in 
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 163. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 741–42 (Pa. 2018) 
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discriminatory.171 In a sign that some limits on hardball remain, Michigan’s 
outgoing Republican governor vetoed a bill that would have stripped 
some power from incoming Democratic officeholders172 around the same 
time New Jersey Democrats also backed away from their attempt to 
engage in extreme gerrymandering.173 Nevertheless, defeated lame-duck 
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker did not exercise similar restraint.174 
These lame-duck power grabs are harder to categorize, but I’ll hazard 
to call them hardball rather than beanball. If separation-of-powers 
arrangements are set by legislation rather than being constitutionally 
enshrined, then the state constitution invites some of this hardball. Early 
voting is helpful, but it is not limitless. States may validly limit how early 
voters can submit their votes in order to ensure the public has a chance 
to deliberate. Two weeks of early voting seems to be an acceptable 
balance. 
What else can be distinguishable as hardball versus beanball? 
Republicans denying Judge Merrick Garland a hearing during his 
Supreme Court nomination was hardball and yet not beanball. Senate 
Republicans legitimately had enough votes to block Garland, and they 
chose an aggressive, norm-busting tactic to maximize their chances to 
prevent any defections.175 It was unprecedented but not fundamentally 
antidemocratic to use their votes to block or delay a confirmation. To 
justify his extreme hardball, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
falsely claimed that Presidents have not appointed Supreme Court 
Justices in presidential election years.176 McConnell’s willingness to make 
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patently false historical claims indicates that he knew he was shattering 
norms. However, lying in politics is too common to be considered beanball. 
Similarly, confirming Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court by eliminating 
the filibuster177 was hardball, but not beanball. 
But Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court confirmation was an example 
of constitutional beanball. The stakes for democracy of rushing a lifetime 
confirmation—without legitimate vetting—are much higher than 
denying or delaying an appointment. The Trump White House and 
Senate Republicans prevented Senate Democrats from receiving full 
access to Kavanaugh’s records178 or full answers to troubling questions 
about his conduct during the Whitewater investigation,179 his time in the 
Bush Administration,180 or mysterious debts that were suddenly paid 
off.181 Republicans also sharply limited the investigation into multiple 
allegations of sexual misconduct.182 Even if Kavanaugh’s statements on 
                                                                                                                           
confirmations include Mahlon Pitney in 1912, Louis Brandeis and John Clarke in 1916, 
Benjamin Cardozo in 1932, Frank Murphy in 1940, and Anthony Kennedy in 1988. See 
Amy Howe, Supreme Court Vacancies in Presidential Election Years, SCOTUSblog (Feb. 
13, 2016), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/supreme-court-vacancies-in-presidential-
election-years/ [https://perma.cc/S26S-ZCLG]. 
 177. See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear 
Path for Gorsuch, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/ 
us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 178. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Withholds 100,000 Pages of Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh’s Records, N.Y. Times (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/01/ 
us/politics/kavanaugh-records.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 179. See Tom Hamburger, Robert Barnes & Robert O’Harrow Jr., Senate Democrats 
Want to Know Whether Kavanaugh Crossed Line as Source During Clinton Probe, Wash. 
Post (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-democrats-want-to-
know-whether-kavanaugh-crossed-line-as-source-during-clinton-probe/2018/08/22/d5cadfce- 
a58a-11e8-a656-943eefab5daf_story.html [https://perma.cc/BFP5-FMKU]. 
 180. See Burgess Everett, New Emails Show Kavanaugh’s Involvement in Controversial 
Nomination, Politico (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/ 
12/kavanaugh-emails-controversial-nomination-817798 [https://perma.cc/7PY8-YNXS]; 
Salvador Rizzo, Did Brett Kavanaugh Give False Testimony Under Oath?, Wash. Post (Sept. 
17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/17/did-brett-kavanaugh-
give-false-testimony-under-oath/ [https://perma.cc/9VXL-X9V3]; Salvador Rizzo, Fact-
Checking the Bipartisan Spinfest on Brett Kavanaugh’s Time at the White House, Wash. Post 
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/08/15/fact-checking-
bipartisan-spinfest-brett-kavanaughs-time-white-house/ [https://perma.cc/EX4H-VCM7]. 
 181. See Amy Brittain, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Piled Up Credit 




 182. See Seung Min Kim & John Wagner, Kavanaugh Moves Closer to Senate 




120 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 119:85 
 
these matters did not rise to the level of perjury, felony false statement, 
or other crimes, they surely warranted a more robust investigation and 
less stonewalling on records. 
While it is common for political actors to play hardball with access to 
information and investigations, a nomination to a lifetime seat on the 
Supreme Court is a special case. The Supreme Court plays a unique role 
in American democracy because of its countermajoritarian function and 
the escalating importance of judicial review and judicial supremacy in the 
American political system. Confirmation hearings are the only chance to 
vet nominees for an office that will shape the United States for decades. 
Blocking valid investigations may be hardball in other contexts, but it was 
beanball in this context. These efforts to sharply limit inquiry and debate 
about a Supreme Court seat were antidemocratic and antideliberative—
the result of a self-imposed deadline before the November election, a fear 
of public opinion, and an ardent refusal to consider another candidate 
because the country is stuck in a culture war. 
The larger context surrounding the Supreme Court also matters. 
The Roberts Court has enabled beanball in its rulings upholding voter-ID 
legislation in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,183 in favor of a 
voter-caging law in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute,184 and striking 
down the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance protections in Shelby County v. 
Holder.185 The Kavanaugh confirmation solidifies a majority willing to 
open the door for beanball tactics. 
Were Democrats playing hardball or beanball by releasing Dr. Christine 
Blasey Ford’s letter, despite her request not to release it?186 I will let 
others interpret that step in this episode. 
As discussed above, the manipulations in George W. Bush’s DOJ, 
leading to the firing of nine U.S. Attorneys, was beanball, because the 
DOJ was misused for partisan purposes to prosecute the opposition, 
protect political allies, and crack down on voting access.187 Some of those 
prosecutions were warranted, some weren’t; but the partisan pressure was 
illegitimate and unacceptable. Presidents have often appointed crony 
attorney generals, but President Nixon took his cronyism to the level of 
beanball with his management of the DOJ through John Mitchell, 
Richard Kleindienst, and Watergate. 188  Now we are seeing another 
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Republican President play beanball with the DOJ. When Obama’s 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch crossed a line by meeting with Bill 
Clinton on the tarmac—even as Hillary Clinton was under investigation 
by the FBI for her use of a private email server while in office as Secretary 
of State—she announced she would accept the recommendations of 
career prosecutors and the FBI director rather than make the decision to 
prosecute herself.189 Trump’s November 2018 appointment of Matthew 
Whitaker as acting attorney general, on the other hand, may have been 
beanball, because Trump’s unprecedented appointment190 reflected an 
intent to impede investigations into the President and his associates and 
protect against indictments.191 
Government shutdowns and bogus emergency declarations to build 
a wall are hardball, not beanball. They do not fundamentally undermine 
democratic participation. But a slippery slope is a legitimate worry: One 
can imagine other emergency declarations that could be used to manipulate 
elections or abuse minority rights. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the most important insights in Fishkin and Pozen’s article 
was a discussion of something that preceded their timeframe of the past 
twenty-five years. They turned to Richard Hofstadter’s 1964 essay, The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics, written in the midst of the Barry 
Goldwater phenomenon.192 They observe that Republicans are engaging 
in “existential politics,” using rhetoric about a “plague” of Democratic 
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voters, apocalyptic themes, and the “Flight 93” metaphor of terror.193 
They quote Hofstadter on paranoid extremism: “[I]f ‘what is at stake is 
always a conflict between absolute good and absolute evil, what is 
necessary is not compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish.’”194 
I would add Hofstadter’s observations about dispossession, which 
ring truer today: 
The spokesmen of those earlier [historical] movements felt 
that they stood for causes and personal types that were still in 
possession of their country—that they were fending off threats 
to a still established way of life. But the modern right wing, as 
Daniel Bell has put it, feels dispossessed: America has been largely 
taken away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try 
to repossess it and to prevent the final destructive act of subversion. 
The old American virtues have already been eaten away by 
cosmopolitans and intellectuals; the old competitive capitalism 
has been gradually undermined by socialistic and communistic 
schemers; the old national security and independence have 
been destroyed by treasonous plots, having as their most 
powerful agents not merely outsiders and foreigners as of old 
but major statesmen who are at the very centers of American 
power. Their predecessors had discovered conspiracies; the 
modern radical right finds conspiracy to be betrayal from on 
high. 
Important changes may also be traced to the effects of the 
mass media. The villains of the modern right are much more 
vivid than those of their paranoid predecessors, much better 
known to the public; the literature of the paranoid style is by 
the same token richer and more circumstantial in personal 
description and personal invective.195 
From Gingrich to Trump, the right feels increasingly dispossessed, so it 
fights back with a sense of entitlement, existential anxiety, and extreme 
tactics.196 “America has been largely taken away from them,” all the more 
so in 2016. “Make America Great Again” means to take America back, to 
repossess it from Obama and the conspiratorial elites, from people of 
color gaining in numbers and status, from women challenging the 
patriarchy. Changes in mass media drive the paranoia, from Fox News to 
social media platforms and their manipulations. These dispossessed seem 
to be saying, “This is my America, and if I can’t have it, no one can.” 
From that sense of entitlement, grievance, and resentment, it is not 
shocking that Republicans have been more aggressively playing hardball 
and beanball. 
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